The Situation is Under Control: Cyberspace situational awareness and the implications of China's internet censorship; Strategic Insights: v.10, issue 1 (Spring 2011) by Sheldon, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011
The Situation is Under Control:
Cyberspace situational awareness and
the implications of China's internet
censorship; Strategic Insights: v.10,
issue 1 (Spring 2011)
Sheldon, Robert
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25462
The Situation is Under Control 




Just prior to his confirmation as Commander of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), General 
Keith B. Alexander identified the need to improve cyberspace situational awareness as one of his 
central responsibilities—and challenges.1 This mission is rooted in the need to monitor computing 
activities across the 15,000 networks and seven million devices that compose the Department of 
Defense (DoD) information and communications technology (ICT) enterprise.2 Complicating this 
mission further, USCYBERCOM must also conduct offensive operations in cyberspace and 
potentially assist the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to defend other information 
systems across the federal government and US critical infrastructures.3 These demands help explain 
what a Defense Information Systems Agency official recently called DoD’s “insatiable desire for 
situational awareness” in cyberspace.4   
Unfortunately for those who would seek to assess USCYBERCOM’s progress, no “gold standard” 
exists for cyberspace situational awareness. It remains challenging to envisage the bounds of future 
situational awareness capabilities, let alone performance metrics. Thus, analyzing the present state of 
cyberspace situational awareness for a potential competitor yields a richer understanding of the 
relative US position. China serves as a sensible counterpart in this comparative analysis for several 
reasons. Some cite China as a potential military competitor5 and future conflicts appear poised to 
spill into (if not originate in) the cyber domain.6 China’s military, moreover, has a well-documented 
offensive cyberwarfare doctrine that in some respects appears directed toward the United States.7  
In parallel, China conducts sometimes “pervasive” internet censorship as part of “one of the largest 
and most sophisticated filtering systems in the world,” according to the OpenNet Initiative.8 
Policymakers traditionally view internet censorship as a human rights issue.9 In the past year, 
however, several technology companies have cogently argued that censorship also acts as a barrier to 
trade.10 This article complements these views with a discussion about internet censorship’s security-
related implications. Specifically, this analysis argues that some of China’s internet censorship 
techniques likely improve that nation’s cyberspace situational awareness—which could affect the 
outcome of a conflict in cyberspace.11  
This argument advances in section II with an explanation of some key concepts. Section III 
provides a brief survey of the development and state of cyberspace situational awareness within the 
United States. Sections IV and V, respectively, explain some key features of the cyber domain in 
China and gauge their impact for cyberspace situational awareness. Section VI identifies some 
inherent tradeoffs in the composition of the cyber domain in China. Section VII offers some 
conclusions and implications for US policymakers.12 
 
                                                
a This paper presents the author’s personal views and does not reflect those of any institution with which he is affiliated. 
The author wishes to thank Edward Monan and several anonymous reviewers, whose thoughtful comments on previous 
drafts helped to greatly improve this paper. 
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II. Definitions and key concepts 
Internet censorship 
For the purposes of this analysis, “internet censorship” is any measure enacted to restrict internet 
accessibility, processes, functions, or content based on sociopolitical imperatives. Such efforts take 
place in four distinct realms: laws and regulations; norms; markets; and architecture.13 This paper 
emphasizes the architectural component, which has the most direct implications for situational 
awareness. The term “architecture” refers to the physical dimension of cyberspace, described in the 
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations as “information systems and networks, computers 
and communications systems, and supporting infrastructures.”14 Architecture also encompasses 
network design and layout and the nature of connections with other networks, including those 
beyond national borders.  
States can conduct censorship at four key architectural layers. These include, from least to most 
centralized: individual computers, organizations, internet service providers (ISPs), and the internet 
backbone.15 China has generally succeeded in exerting control at each of these four layers. For 
example, at the individual layer, Tencent’s popular instant messaging software QQ incorporates a 
client-based keyword-blocking utility.16 At the organizational layer, China requires all internet 
content providers, such as websites, to gain licenses and comply with censorship mandates.17 China 
“outsources” some censorship responsibilities to ISPs, the third architectural layer, which must 
police domestic internet content and enforce website closures.18 Finally, this article centers on 
China’s robust filtering activities at the internet backbone layer, specifically at gateways between 
Chinese networks and the rest of the internet.19 
 
Cyberspace situational awareness 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has no official, unified definition for “cyberspace situational 
awareness,”20 despite the term’s frequent, government-wide usage since the mid-2000s.21 The 2006 
National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, however, sufficiently describes the concept:  
Cyberspace situational awareness enables commanders and planners to assess the current 
situation, collaborate on courses of action, take action, and anticipate opportunities and 
challenges in the domain. Automated tools must be employed to provide near-real time 
notification of anomalous activity and properly inject appropriate data into operational views 
to characterize the cyberspace activity. This situational awareness combined with proper risk 
assessments, including intelligence loss or gain determinations, will allow commanders to 
make the best decisions on courses of action.22 
An important distinction must be made between enterprise situational awareness and domain situational 
awareness.23 Enterprise situational awareness is visibility of the events and activities within a single 
entity’s networks. This capability would, for example, enable informed computer network defense 
operations. However, defense against a large-scale, coordinated cyberattack targeting government, 
private industry, and privately owned infrastructures would require some level of situational 
awareness across multiple entities. Thus, domain situational awareness is visibility of events and 
activities spanning national (and ideally international) networks. This analysis addresses certain 
enterprise-level issues, but focuses on the domain level.  
◆ ◆ ◆ 
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III. Cyberspace situational awareness in the United States 
Policy 
In many aspects of the cyber domain, particularly those that relate to computer network attack, US 
capabilities appear far more advanced than the policies that guide their use. This resembles the early 
phases of the nuclear age, prior to the advent of deterrence theory and other guiding concepts.24 
Situational awareness is one of the few elements of the cyber domain where policy is more fully 
developed than enabling technologies and capabilities (discussed below). Several official documents 
and statements indicate the US government’s policy: more is better.  
With respect to enterprise situational awareness, the 2011 US budget states that the Office of 
Management and Budget should initiate ICT programs and activities that promote the “[m]ove 
towards Situational Awareness across the Government”. The document asserts that: 
More frequent reporting, near or at real-time, is imperative for developing situational 
awareness across the Federal enterprise. The use of Security Information Management or 
Security Information Event Management tools will assist in progressing towards real time 
security awareness and management in the Government.25 
This echoes two components of the US Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). 
One specific initiative is to “[d]eploy an intrusion detection system of sensors across the Federal 
enterprise.” This project aims to bolster the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-
CERT) situational awareness so it can better develop and distribute security information.26  A related 
initiative is to “[p]ursue deployment of intrusion prevention systems across the Federal enterprise.” 
This step intends to improve situational awareness with more advanced capabilities to “identify and 
characterize malicious network traffic” in order to prevent its access to protected networks.27 
Official US government statements also indicate the need to improve domain situational awareness. 
USCYBERCOM Commander Keith B. Alexander recently characterized the cyber domain as one 
with “strong adversary capabilities and weak situational awareness.” He described intentions to: 
build an effective cyber-situational awareness in real time through a common, shareable 
operating picture. We must share indications in warning threat data at Net speed among and 
between the various operating domains. We must synchronize command-and-control of 
integrated defensive and offensive capabilities, also at Net speed. 28 
The CNCI also addresses the need for domain situational awareness capabilities. Specifically, one 
initiative is to “[c]onnect current cyber ops [operations] centers to enhance situational awareness.” 
This element seeks to “support shared situational awareness and collaboration across six centers that 
are responsible for carrying out US cyber activities,” through “shared analytic and collaborative 
technologies.”29 Similarly, DHS’s Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to the 
2010 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, includes as a primary goal the need to enhance 
cyberspace situational awareness across the entire ICT sector.30 
 
Capabilities 
Progress towards these ends is evident, but legal and structural impediments remain. With respect to 
enterprise situational awareness, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano recently announced that the 
Einstein 2 program, which can “automatically detect and disrupt malicious cyber activity,” is almost 
fully deployed across the “.gov” domain. Development of the program’s third iteration is already 
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underway.31 For its part, DoD designated that one of USCYBERCOM’s key missions is to elevate 
cyberspace situational awareness.32 Additionally, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
Lynn, DoD has deployed three layers of protection for US military networks, or the “.mil” domain,33 
of which two relate to industry best practices and appear to enhance situational awareness 
capabilities. These initiatives appear to have already stemmed malicious activity: security incidents on 
DoD networks decreased in 2010 for the first time in a decade.34 
The US government has made other advancements at the domain level. In what probably constitutes 
the third and outermost layer of protection for its networks, DoD reportedly developed 
relationships with “tier 1” ISPs to identify and terminate malicious traffic from foreign sources 
before it reaches DoD networks.35 DHS operates a “dashboard” that aggregates routing data and 
other information to provide real-time situational awareness about the state of the internet 
throughout the country. Critically, it can show when segments of the internet are down, which can 
help officials diagnose whether the root cause of the outage might be a natural disaster, a power 
outage, or perhaps an attack. The dashboard can even highlight areas with extreme network 
congestion, which could draw attention to infrastructure malfunctions.36  
Recent government efforts reveal imperfect but strengthening capabilities. For example, a DHS-
sponsored exercise series called “Cyber Storm” seeks to strengthen preparedness for a contingency 
in cyberspace, in part by improving enterprise and domain situational awareness. One of the 
exercise’s four primary objectives is to “[v]alidate information sharing relationships and 
communications paths for collecting and disseminating cyber incident situational awareness, 
response and recovery information.”37 One of the key findings of the exercise’s first iteration, held in 
February 2006, was that “[p]layers were challenged when attempting to develop an integrated 
situational awareness picture and cohesive impact assessment across sectors and attack vectors.”38 
The following exercise, held in March 2008, cites improvements but maintains that a better 
“[u]nderstanding [of] the interconnectedness and cause/effect relationships between actions taken 
by each organization would help to maintain broad situational awareness and galvanize a holistic 
approach to cyber response.”39 
Several factors, however, may impede the US government’s prospects for improving cyberspace 
situational awareness.40 First, with respect to laws, the executive branch operates on the basis of 
guidelines included in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Electronic Communications and 
Privacy Act, the PATRIOT Act (which includes provisions for National Security Letters), the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, and elsewhere. These laws can limit 
surveillance and other activities related to situational awareness, particularly with respect to data 
traversing US infrastructures or involving US persons.  
Other checks, from a structural standpoint, include the market-driven and generally decentralized 
development of internet infrastructures. For example, US internet traffic destined abroad (and 
foreign traffic destined for the United States) may transit any of the approximately 19 undersea cable 
landing facilities along the US east and west coasts. Moreover, internet access in the United States is 
multimodal. That is, users may connect in a variety of ways, including by satellite. Finally, there are 
thousands of ISPs operating in the United States, of which perhaps a half dozen are considered “tier 
1” providers. As a corollary, numerous US firms operate the international gateways that connect the 
internet in the United States to internet infrastructures in foreign countries. This multitude of 
infrastructure actors severely complicates efforts to establish comprehensive cyberspace domain 
situational awareness. 
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IV. Key features of the cyber domain in China41 
In contrast to the abundance of US policy statements on cyberspace situational awareness, there are 
few indicators of Chinese views on the subject. In absolute terms, China’s enterprise situational 
awareness status is probably less robust than its US counterparts.  Software piracy—rampant in 
China—adversely affects software updates and patch implementation, management, and other 
essential aspects of system hygiene. Microsoft, for example, recently estimated that 90 percent of its 
software in use in China is pirated.42 Depending on the vendor, unlicensed server software may not 
get critical patches and copies of antivirus software may not receive updated definitions. Pirated 
operating systems, web browsers, media players, and other software may also be affected. 
Notwithstanding recent efforts to counter the use of pirated software, it remains a common feature 
of even Chinese government computers.43 Moreover, China consistently ranks in the top few 
countries with the most infected computers (although the United States is often in its company).44  
Less is known about the state of China’s domain situational awareness. However, an analysis of 
some of the key architectural features of the cyberspace domain in China can inform our 
understanding of China’s cyber domain situational awareness prospects. Two features in particular—
international gateways and filtering capabilities—bear closer examination. 
 
International Gateways 
The overwhelming majority of China’s internet communications with the outside world transit just 
three international gateways located in Beijing in the north, Shanghai in the east, and Guangzhou in 
the south.45 By design, this centralization of international internet connections allows Chinese 
authorities to exert a significant level of control over data traversing China’s national-level 
networks.46 As a result, according to an account by journalist James Fallows, Chinese authorities can: 
physically monitor all [internet] traffic into or out of the country. They do so by installing at 
each of these few “international gateways” a device called a “tapper” or “network sniffer,” 
which can mirror every packet of data going in or out…. “Mirroring” is the term for normal 
copying or backup operations, and in this case real though extremely small mirrors are 
employed. Information travels along fiber-optic cables as little pulses of light, and as these 
travel through the Chinese gateway routers, numerous tiny mirrors bounce reflections of 
them to a separate set of… computers. 47 
 
Filtering Capabilities 
This separate set of computers, known colloquially as China’s “Great Firewall,”48 allows Chinese 
authorities to surveil and filter internet traffic. The system leverages a set of mechanisms to evaluate 
and analyze data destined for networks outside China.49 Most of this data is directed to the rest of 
the internet via undersea cables to transit points throughout East Asia. However, when the Great 
Firewall identifies data considered offensive by China’s authorities, the system resets the attempted 
connection in order to terminate the data transmission.50 Technical research corroborates Mr. 
Fallows’ account that data transiting between internet destinations in China and abroad are indeed 
mirrored to “out of band” machines, which are separate and parallel to the core routers that 
facilitate the transactions.51 Computer researchers refer to these machines as intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as 
applications or devices for “monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and 
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analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation 
of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.”52  
China’s IDS employs deep packet inspection (DPI), described by computer security firm Symantec 
as the ability “to look within the application payload of a packet or traffic stream and make decisions 
on the significance of that data based on the content of that data” (emphasis original).53 This is 
opposed to less sophisticated utilities that only analyze data labels, such as packet headers, which 
contain important but less specific information like data origin and destination. In practice, for 
example, DPI allows the Great Firewall to not only determine when a user in China attempts to 
establish a connection to www.bbc.co.uk (label), but whether the specific page requested contains 
keywords related to the Falun Gong (content).  
An important caveat here is that DPI technology is generally effective only on data sent “in the 
clear,” or in unencrypted form. This weakness allows users to leverage virtual private networks 
(VPN) to “scale” the Great Firewall. Although Chinese authorities could simply block encrypted 
internet traffic destined abroad, such a move could immediately halt substantial levels of foreign 
business operations in China, which the government is loathe to do.54 However, at least one firm 
with business activities in China55 advertises DPI suites that use signatures to communicate a “broad 
range of criteria, header information, actual payload, bi-directional traffic information and the 
characteristics… even as applications get encrypted.”56 Such technologies raise questions about how 
long encrypted traffic can remain a sanctuary from China’s data inspections.  
 
V. Implications for situational awareness 
There are at least five components of situational awareness: intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, and common operating picture. 57 For the purposes of 
this analysis, reconnaissance is how to find something; surveillance is how to track it; and 
intelligence is the actionable results of these (and related) efforts.58 Environmental monitoring 
involves the attempt to understand natural and unnatural influences and events and their impact on 
a domain. Common operating picture is a holistic and shared view of information from numerous 
inputs and sources across a domain. Although complete treatment of how each concept applies to 
cyberspace is beyond the scope of this paper, all are at least somewhat affected by the architectural 
features of China’s censorship regime.59 
Intelligence: The Great Firewall’s main function is traffic inspection and termination, but the system 
could conceivably employ features designed to collect intelligence. Although it would be infeasible 
to retain all of the mirrored internet traffic for any longer than it takes to conduct a cursory 
inspection, some data could be stored for later analysis and exploitation.  If such a capability is in 
place, data could be flagged for retention at the router or IDS level based on predetermined 
parameters. Rules implemented within this system could direct potentially useful data to a storage 
device for further review by human analysts. 60 Though the existence of such an inspection regime is 
purely speculative, the possibility appears within reach of China’s authorities. From a technical 
standpoint, it would even be less challenging than basic filtering (given that the central obstacle 
would be the review and manipulation of all data, which China currently does). 
These potential intelligence-related features present more cause for concern when viewed in light of 
China’s ability to essentially import internet traffic from abroad. Although by no means unique—
ISPs in other nations have previously done the same thing—China briefly demonstrated this 
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capability in April 2010. In that incident—which could have been accidental—state-owned China 
Telecom propagated improper routing information that instructed US and other foreign internet 
traffic to transit Chinese servers. The event affected traffic to and from, among other things, the 
web domains associated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and all four US military 
services. 61 Affected traffic would likely have transited the Great Firewall and thus could have been 
censored or exposed to any intelligence collection or analysis features inherent in the system. 
Surveillance: China’s control of the internet extends beyond censorship and into surveillance.62 The 
general trend is well documented,63 but specific architectural aspects of the Great Firewall enhance 
these capabilities. In particular, all information that transits the Great Firewall must include origin 
and destination information, such as Internet Protocol address or domain; these data could 
conceivably be logged according to rules triggered by keywords or other predetermined 
specifications.64 Such information could have numerous applications; for example, it could explain 
accounts of software used by Chinese authorities that issues reports when specific users in China 
access banned websites.65 Of note for people outside China, the Great Firewall reportedly has 
bidirectional functionality, meaning users outside China can be prevented from viewing content on 
sites hosted within China.66 By extension, foreign users who attempt to connect to Chinese nodes 
may face some level of surveillance, to the extent that it is inherent in the systems that compose the 
Great Firewall.   
Reconnaissance: If Chinese authorities leverage the Great Firewall to analyze traffic, the limited 
number of international gateways would simplify the process. That virtually all internet traffic 
between China and the outside world transits three locations would significantly bind the complexity 
of information mining.67 Consider a scenario where Chinese authorities sought to locate a user based 
on a unique identifier, such as email address:68 the fewer the transit points, the more efficient the 
search. For people and systems within China, it would be far more pragmatic to conduct 
reconnaissance activities at the ISP level, but the gateway level would serve to identify the correct 
ISP to approach in the event that that information was not already known to authorities. Again, 
bearing in mind the Great Firewall’s bidirectional nature, such reconnaissance activities may also 
have implications for users outside China communicating with users or connecting to sites inside 
China. China’s network infrastructure abroad may also have a suite of features that, though perhaps 
harmless, could facilitate reconnaissance. China Telecom Americas Corporation’s promotional 
materials call its network “traceable,” with “real-time monitoring and reporting.”69   
Environmental Monitoring: One of the unique features of the cyberspace domain is the relative 
indivisibility of the domain itself from a given system within that domain. In the space domain, the 
evaluation of space weather and events to determine how they might affect space systems, such as 
satellites, is fairly straightforward (though certainly not simple). In cyberspace, enterprises should 
similarly seek to understand significant “environmental” events, such as viruses and malfunctions in 
exterior networks.70  But in the sense that the government has a vital interest in ensuring that the 
cyber domain itself—and all domestic segments in particular—remain operational, it would be 
arbitrary to separate a system of interest from other networks and infrastructures. For example, a 
key government entity might perfectly defend its networks, but if an attack disrupts upstream 
systems—such as the entity’s ISP—key systems could still be denied access to the internet. In this 
light, environmental monitoring should include any substantial event in the cyber domain. 
Some evidence suggests that Chinese authorities previously configured routers on national-level 
networks to filter virus-related traffic.71 To bolster this capability, gateway filtering could operate in a 
similar capacity. The limited number of gateways creates comprehensive vantage points that could 
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help inform battle damage assessment across networks and enable mitigation efforts, particularly if 
an attack lacks a readily identifiable signature to block. For example, monitoring bandwidth might 
help administrators estimate the effects of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting 
numerous sites across multiple ISPs. Other “sensors” at the gateways could monitor routing data to 
provide reports on route hijacking or other unusual events. 
Common Operating Picture: The confluence of all traffic at just three international gateways could also 
help enable threat characterization analysis. China has an active marketplace for data mining utilities, 
frequently used for surveillance applications,72 which may offer efficient ways to identify and parse 
events and trends on the internet. Unity of effort is another imperative related to common operating 
picture, and these “hubs” could facilitate a coordinated response by various Chinese entities in the 
event of a cyberattack or counterattack. Moreover, any of the monitoring scenarios described above 
could have implications for tracking “red” and “blue” forces (in China’s usage, friendly and 
adversary, respectively), which is a key component of traditional common operating picture 
requirements.  
 
VI. Balancing equities 
Although situational awareness is clearly a desirable end in the cyber domain, the means employed 
by China imply some important tradeoffs. Three in particular merit consideration. First, states must 
determine how to allocate resources in the cyber domain, and skilled personnel might well be the 
key constraint. Second, states may have an interest in the topology of their networks, particularly the 
extent to which infrastructure should be centralized. Third, if states view cyberspace as a potential 
domain of conflict, infrastructure and force structure should be optimized to address contingencies 
based on threat assessments.  
Resource allocation: China’s censorship system is rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
perception about how best to maintain regime stability. Thus, from a defense planning perspective, 
derivative gains in situational awareness are essentially free. However, it is unclear that Chinese 
investments in ICT architecture reflect risk analyses that weigh censorship against the potential 
implications of a cyberwar, which could also affect the CCP’s ability to maintain social control. 
Assuming a finite pool of human capital with the advanced skills required to operate in the cyber 
domain, man-hours expended on censorship activities—even with their ancillary benefits for 
cyberspace situational awareness—come at the expense of other cyberwar-related capabilities.73 
These could include, among other things, cyber defense, cyber offense, command and control in 
cyberspace, and cyberspace reconstitution capabilities.  
Network topology: The CCP’s perceived need for censorship influenced the development of China’s 
internet architecture, resulting in considerable centralization. Though helpful for filtering and 
situational awareness, this comes at the expense of robust redundancy. This may be an acceptable 
trade-off at the enterprise level.74 However, centralized architecture at the domain level raises 
questions about the sustainability of internet access in a conflict scenario. This could have 
implications for China’s ability to retaliate in cyberspace, which raises two key concerns. First, the 
absence of an assured second strike capability in cyberspace could give China a destabilizing 
incentive to strike preemptively.75 Second, denied access to the cyber domain could promote 
escalation into other domains of war.76 
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Figure 1: China’s primary international internet connections77 
Source: 
China Telecom, USA 
 
China’s international gateways connect its six national-level networks78 to one or more of seven 
international land-submarine cables that link China to the rest of the internet.79 Causing a power 
outage in the three cities that host international gateway facilities, a conceivable objective in the 
context of conflict in cyberspace, could substantially isolate China from the rest of the internet.80  
The physical disruption of one or more of the China’s international submarine cables could cause 
even greater damage. Attacks on such cables would be a severe measure, as their disruption would 
adversely affect the internet throughout the region.81 Moreover, US cyberspace operations have been 
canceled in the past for fear of unknown or uncontrollable effects.82 Still, while global 
telecommunications interdependence may be more entrenched today than ever before, the 
precedent for targeting undersea communications cables dates back to the First World War.83 Such 
assets could be targeted again in a serious contingency. 
Domain optimization: The discussion above suggests that China’s domain configuration yields some 
benefits for cyberspace situational awareness at the expense of other features. Although China’s 
internet architecture probably evolved independently of these considerations, the Chinese 
government is nonetheless left with forces and infrastructure that appear better equipped to handle 
limited rather than total conflicts in cyberspace. For example, in a constrained engagement, 
situational awareness might be the primary consideration, as it could enable smart defense and 
mitigation techniques. By contrast, in a more intense scenario, emphasis might shift to favor 
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offensive actions. To the extent that resources available for each mission are drawn from the same 
pool, this would relatively diminish the importance assigned to domain situational awareness 
activities. Of course, it remains unknown whether this orientation aligns with the Chinese 
government’s threat perception regarding the relative likelihood of limited versus severe conflict in 
cyberspace.  
 
VII. Policy Implications 
The United States must consider the security implications of internet filtering activities. This may 
influence the urgency and means with which US policy seeks to address internet censorship and 
related activities abroad. By extension, a policy that accounts for the nexus between certain 
censorship activities and cyberspace situational awareness could alter present views about the 
permissibility of US firms’ assistance to foreign countries’ censorship activities.84 In particular, 
situations that involve technology transfer could require some sort of regulation or oversight.85  
The United States must also “balance equities” in cyberspace. One of the defining characteristics of 
the United States’ approach to the cyber domain, particularly when compared to China, is the 
numerous limitations on the US government’s ability to collect information that might aid situational 
awareness. While the United States requires improved cyberspace situational awareness, it remains 
unclear whether this end necessitates or justifies drastic adjustments to legal and structural checks. 
Alternative technologies or systems—perhaps even administered by private entities, such as a 
consortium of ISPs—might yield sufficient domain-level situational awareness capabilities. Such a 
mechanism might eventually serve as the foundation for a wider application of what appears to be 
DoD’s approach to stopping malicious traffic at the “tier 1” ISP level.86 Policymakers must 
recognize, however, that such activities are not costless and could require government support 
through subsidies, tax breaks, or other incentives.  
In the event that improvements do require alterations to existing legal and structural checks, each 
change should reflect a deliberate, inclusive, and transparent review process. Moreover, each 
potential change ought to be justified through cost-benefit analyses related to resource allocation, 
network topology, and domain optimization, as described above, or another compelling rationale. 
Finally, on a tactical level, internet architecture should be a central factor in the context of defensive 
and offensive cyberspace operational planning.  
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